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Abstract
The main purpose of this short paper is to examine how traditional Downsian
dynamics (convergence of the parties to the median of the distribution) are altered by
the introduction of centrifugal incentives arising from the fact that any motion towards
the center induces a lost of votes at the extremes of the electorate. Our analysis
provides a new rationale for platform dierentiation. It also yields new insights in the
case when centripetal incentives are dominant on one side of the political spectrum
while centrifugal incentives take over on the other side. This may apply for instance
to the 2012 French elections.
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this short paper is to explore the equilibrium behavior of two parties
in a one dimensional spatial model of electoral competition, say [0; 1] ; similar to Hotelling
(1929) and Downs (1957) except1 for the fact that we introduce some centrifugal incentives.
To quote Cox (1990) to whom we borrow this terminology: "Centripetal incentives lead
political parties (or candidates) to advocate centrist policies; centrifugal incentives, on the
other hand, lead to the advocacy of more of less extreme positions". In this paper, by
centrifugal incentives, me mean, more broadly, incentives for each party to move in the
direction of the other rather than moving towards the center as the notion of center is not
always very well dened. Centrifugal incentives may arise from several sources. Here, we
have in mind the situation where the two competing parties face the presence of two extreme
parties (with xed positions) at the extreme left and right of the ideological spectrum. Some
of the left (right) voters may decide to vote for the extreme left (right)party if they nd
the conventional left (right) candidate moving too much towards the center. Our model
introduces these incentives in the simplest conceivable way. This model may well describe
the situation of the 2012 French presidential election where the two conventional left and
right candidates (Hollande and Sarkozy) were facing Melenchon at the extreme left and Le
Pen at the extreme right. Political observers agree on the fact that the presence of the two
extremes had strong implications on the nature of the electoral competition between the two
main contenders.
Three types of congurations may happen.
The rst one describes the case where for both parties, centripetal incentives dominate
centrifugal incentives. In that case, the Downsian logic of minimal dierentiation where the
two parties converge towards a point which may be more or less close to the center depending
on the degree of asymmetry between the centrifugal incentives of the two parties applies.
For the uniform distribution, the point of convergence will belong to the interval

1
3
; 2
3

.
In contrast, the second one describes a case where for both parties, centrifugal incen-
tives dominate centripetal incentives. Not surprisingly, in such cases each party converges
towards its extreme position. We have a situation of maximal dierentiation. However, as
we will see this case raises some interesting coordination problems if the parties are totally
opportunistic i.e. without real attachment to the left or the right. If such a coordination
mechanism is absent we prove existence of a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. The
1We refer to Duggan (2012) and Osborne (1995) for nice surveys of the multiplicity of variants of the
Hotelling-Downs's model which have studied in the literature.
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expected degree of platform dierentiation in this equilibrium is increasing in the degree of
the centrifugal incentives.
The third conguration2 describes an interesting situation where the balance between
the two types of incentives is not the same for the two parties. For one party (say the one
on the right) centrifugal incentives dominate centripetal incentives while the domination is
reversed for the other party (the one on the left). In such case, the type of dynamics (out of
equilibrium) that we should observe is the right party moving to the extreme right in order
to (re)conquer part of this electorate and the left party chasing after it to conquer its more
moderate voters lost on the way, even at the expense of losing some of the voters at the
extreme left as the lost is by assumption not too severe. This may well be the situation that
has occurred in the last rounds of the 2012 campaign of French presidential elections. Sarkozy
has been advocating policies targeted to the extreme right while Hollande was gaining voters
at the center without the fear of losing too much voters on the left. This conguration is
interesting as there is no equilibrium in pure strategies : the best reply dynamics are chaotic.
We will demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. One interesting
feature of the equilibrium is that the support is distant the more extreme plies on the left
and that no party plays extreme left policies but the density is decreasing which means that
a signicant fraction of the probability mass is concentrated around the leftist policy in the
support.
Our analysis provides a rationale for platform dierentiation when parties are purely
oce-motivated and identical in every possible dimension. Platform dierentiation in a uni-
dimensional setting is usually understood in the literature as the result of some kind of
asymmetry between the two competing parties. The predominant explanations3 combine
a) uncertainty about the preferences of the voters, b) asymmetric policy preferences4 (the
two competing parties are not purely oce motivated and they have conicting policy pref-
erences) and c) asymmetric valence characteristics5 (one of the two parties is perceived to
have a non-policy advantage over the other). The present approach indicates that platform
dierentiation could be totally independent of the characteristics of the two parties and be
due to other elements of the political environment. Our approach relates to Palfrey (1984)
2There is some similarity between the game in that conguration (when  = 1 and  = 0) and the uni-
directional Hotelling-Downs 's model analysed in Cancian, Bergstrom and Bills (1995),Gabszewicz, Laussel
and Le Breton (2008) and Xefteris (2012).
3See Calvert (1985) and Roemer (2001).
4Notable examples are Wittman (1977), Ortuno-Ortin (1997), Llavador (2006) and Roemer (1994, 1997).
5Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Laussel and Le Breton (2002), Hummel (2010) and Aragones and Xefteris
(2012) show that in such cases pure strategy equilibria do not exist and, thus, the expected degree of policy
dierentiation is not degenerate.
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who shows that two oce-motivated candidates may dierentiate in equilibrium if they ex-
pect entry of a third candidate; each of the two established candidates is afraid that if she
approaches the other established candidate too much then the entrant will locate such that
she will loose all extreme voters at her side. That is, Palfrey (1984) considers that an estab-
lished candidate either takes all the extreme voters at her side or none while in our model
each candidate may take any arbitrary fraction of the extreme voters; our approach allows
us to analyze any possible degree of centrifugal incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the game. Then, in section
3, we provide some general results. In section 4 we expose the equilibrium analysis in the
case where the electorate is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. Finally in section 5, we discuss
some side issues including extensions, interpretations of our setup and equilibrium analysis.
2 The Model
Consider two political parties 1 and 2 competing for an electorate on the interval [0; 1]. Each
voter is described by an ideal point: if a voter votes for one of these two parties, he votes for
the party which is the closest to his ideal point. The distribution of ideal points is described
by a cumulative distribution function F which is assumed to be absolutely continuous with
a density denoted f . We denote by x and y the platforms of parties 1 and 2. For a prole
(x; y) 2 [0; 1]2, we assume that their electoral shares 1(x; y) and 2(x; y) are as follows:
1(x; y) =
8<:
F (x) + (F (x+y
2
)  F (x)) if x < y
1
2
((1  F (x)) + F (x)) if x = y
(1  F (x)) + (F (x)  F (x+y
2
)) if x > y
and
2(x; y) =
8<:
(1  F (y)) + (F (y)  F (x+y
2
)) if x < y
1
2
((1  F (x)) + F (x)) if x = y
F (y) + (F (x+y
2
)  F (y)) if x > y
where  and  are parameters in [0; 1]. The behavioral assumptions behind this algebra
are as follows. It is assumed that voters who feel that the political debate oers a "true"
(between left and right) choice vote (as in Downs) for the party which is the closest to their
ideal point. Only a fraction  of those who consider the menu too rightist vote for the less
rightist party and only a fraction  of those who consider the menu too leftist vote for the
less leftist party. We may assume that the voters who do not vote either abstain or vote
for a minority party located to the extreme left or to the extreme right. A more structural
defense of that behavior appears in section 5.
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This two-player game displays some features that need to be emphasized. First, we note
that unless  =  = 1, the game is not zero-sum. In spite of the fact that the game is
competitive, it also contains coordination dimensions. Second, the game is symmetric in the
sense that 1(x; y) = 2(y; x) for all (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2. In particular, 1(x; x) = 2(x; x) for all
x 2 [0; 1]. Third, the game is discontinuous: the function is discontinuous on the diagonal
of the square. Discontinuous games raise intricate diculties as they do not necessarily
admit equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we prove existence of an equilibrium for
the general case using the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) conditions and we then construct
explicitly an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the uniform distribution case.
The conventional Downs-Hotelling model corresponds to  =  = 1. We assume that the
two parties want to maximize their expected electoral supports instead of the probability
of winning the election. The standard Downsian specication pays attention exclusively
to centripetal forces, that is, incentives pushing each party to move in the direction of its
opponent. Centrifugal electoral incentives are absent. The party on the left has an incentive
to move on the right as the cost of losing electors on its left is equal to 0.
The model that we consider introduces centrifugal forces. For the sake of illustration,
consider the incentives of party 2 in the case where x < y. We have:
@2
@y
(x; y) = (1  )f(y)  1
2
f(
x+ y
2
)
and therefore:
@2
@y
(x; y) < 0 if and only if (1  )f(y)  1
2
f(
x+ y
2
) < 0:
If  is close to 1, not surprisingly, the inequality is likely to holds true as the right party
does not lose too much voters on its right by moving to the left. At the other extreme, that
is, when  = 0, the condition writes f(y) < 1
2
f(x+y
2
). If the density does not decrease too
fast, it will not be satised. For instance, when F is uniform, it does not hold true. Precisely,
when F is uniform, the general inequality holds true if and only if  > 1
2
.
3 General Remarks
As already noted, the payo functions are discontinuous. Let us look at them from the
perspective of party 1 when the distribution of voters is uniform..
Let minf; g > 1
2
. In such a case the centripetal incentives are strong and, thus, the
payo function 1 is increasing on [0; y[, decreasing on ]y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at
5
y i y 6= 
+
. The discontinuity is as depicted on gure 1 if y > 
+
or as depicted on gure
2 if y < 
+
.
Insert Figure 1 here
Insert Figure 2 here
Now, let maxf; g < 1
2
. In such case, the centrifugal incentives are strong and, thus,the
payo function 1 is decreasing on [0; y[, increasing on ]y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at
y i y 6= 
+
. Since 1(0; y) =
y
2
; 1(1; y) =
1 y
2
and 1(y; y) =
y+(1 y)
2
, the best response
of party 1 to y is 0 if y > 1
2
and 1 if y < 1
2
. Indeed, since maxf; g < 1
2
, we cannot have
both y
2
< y+(1 y)
2
and 1 y
2
< y+(1 y)
2
. But the value at one extreme may be smaller than
the value at the discontinuity point. The graph of 1 is as depicted on gure 3 if y >

+
or
as depicted on gure 4 if y < 
+
.
Insert Figure 3 here
Insert Figure 4 here
Finally, let  > 1
2
> : In such case, the centrifugal incentives are strong to the right and
the centripetal incentives are strong to the left and, thus, the payo function 1 is increasing
on [0; y[, increasing on ]y; 1] and displays a discontinuity at y i y 6= 
+
. The graph of 1
is as depicted on gure 5 if y > 
+
or as depicted on gure 6 if y < 
+
.
Insert Figure 5 here
Insert Figure 6 here
Remark 1 The discontinuity of 1(x; y) at y 6= + and of 2(x; y) at x 6= + implies,
whenever  +  > 0, that the two parties' strategies cannot have an atom at the same point
x 6= 
+
because each party would obtain a strictly larger payo by choosing a platform just
to the right or to the left of such an x: This rules out symmetric pure strategy equilibria other
than x = y = 
+
as well as symmetric atomic mixed strategy equilibria.
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Equilibrium existence in such discontinuous games is not straightforward. Our rst task
will be to demonstrate that our game satises the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) conditions
which guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies in games with disconti-
nuities.
Proposition 1 The game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for any (; ) 2
[0; 1]2 and any absolutely continuous F .
Proof. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) show that if a) the strategy space for each player
is represented by a closed interval, b) the payo functions are continuous except on a set
of measure zero, c) the players' cumulative payo function is upper semi-continuous, d) the
range of the payo function of each player is bounded and e) the payo function of each
player is weakly lower semi-continuous for any given strategy of the other player, then the
game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Therefore, to prove that our game admits
a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies the only thing that we have to do is to show that all
these ve conditions are met.
a) The strategy space for each player is [0; 1]; a closed interval.
b) 1(x; y) and 2(x; y) are continuous except for the main diagonal, that is, except for
x = y. This line obviously represents a measure zero of all the possible pure strategy proles
which are given by [0; 1]2.
c) 1(x; y)+2(x; y) = F (minfx; yg)+F (maxfx; yg) F (minfx; yg)+(1 F (maxfx; yg))
is obviously a continuous function. That is, it is upper semi-continuous as well.
d) 0  1(x; y)  1 and 0  2(x; y)  1 for any (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2: That is, the players'
payos are bounded.
e) 1(x; y) is weakly lower semi-continuous in x if 8x 2 [0; 1]; 9 2 [0; 1] such that for
y = x;
 lim inf
x! y
1(x; y) + (1  ) lim inf
x!+y
1(x; y)  1(x; y):
If y 2 (0; 1) then observe that for y = x; 1(x; y) = F (y)+(1 F (y))2 ; lim infx! y 1(x; y) =
F (y) and lim infx!+y 1(x; y) = (1 F (y)): It is evident that for  = 12 the required weak
inequality becomes an equality for any (; ) 2 [0; 1]2 and any absolutely continuous F and,
thus, always holds. If y 2 f0; 1g (say for example that y = 0) then for y = x; 1(x; y) = 2 and
lim infx!+y 1(x; y) = : In this case the denition of weak lower semi-continuity requires
that lim infx!+y 1(x; y)  1(x; y) which holds for any (; ) 2 [0; 1]2 and any absolutely
continuous F: That is, 1(x; y) (and equivalently 2(x; y)) is weakly lower semi-continuous
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and the game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 2
To have a better understanding of the behavior of parties in this model we explicitly
characterize an equilibrium for the uniform case and any parameter values (; ) 2 [0; 1]2 in
the next section.
4 Equilibria in the Case of a Uniform Distribution
In this section, we explore the Nash equilibria of the game which has been dened in section
2 in the case where F is uniform on [0; 1]. In such case a game is described by the vector
of parameters (; ). We will partition the unit square into three dierent areas. Since the
game is symmetric, this amounts to considering the following three cases, which correspond
to subsets of parameters of non-zero measure.
Case 1 (centripetal incentives):maxf; g > 1
2
and minf; g  1
2
Case 2 (mixed incentives): maxf; g > 1
2
> minf; g
Case 3 (centrifugal incentives): maxf; g  1
2
and minf; g < 1
2
:
The section is divided into two subsections. In the rst subsection, we examine the set of
pure strategy Nash equilibria and the second one, we turn our attention to mixed strategy
Nash equilibria.
4.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
We distinguish three broad cases according to the nature of incentives, centripetal, mixed
or centrifugal. But we rst deal with the limit case where the centrifugal and centripetal
incentives balance exactly, i.e.  =  = 1
2
: Clearly this point represents a measure zero of
all possible couples of parameters values in [0; 1]2 :
Let rst  =  = 1
2
, then the game is as follows:
1(x; y) =
8<:
y
2
if x < y
1
4
if x = y
1 y
2
if x > y
It is easy to check that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. Precisely, up to inter-
changeability, (x; y) with x  y is a Nash equilibrium if and only x  1
2
and y  1
2
. The
Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked: the smaller is x and the larger is y, the larger are the
payos of both players.
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4.1.1 Case 1. ( Centripetal Incentives)
We speak of centripetal incentives when the voters who do not abstain or vote for a
minority party constitute a majority on both sides and a strict majority at least on one of
the two sides.
Proposition 2 If maxf; g > 1
2
and minf; g  1
2
then the pure strategy prole
f 
+
; 
+
g is the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let  > 1
2
and   1
2
: Consider x < y: Then:
@1
@x
(x; y) =   1
2
> 0 and @2
@y
(x; y) = 1
2
    0
That is, there is generically (minf; g > 1
2
) no pure strategies equilibrium in which
candidates oer distinct platforms.
Now consider x = y = x: In this case we have:
1(x; x) = 2(x; x) =
1
2
((1  x) + x):
If x > 
+
then party 1 by deviating to ex = x  " gets a payo of:
1(ex; x) = (x  ") + (2x "2   (x  ")) = 12"+ x  "! x for "! 0:
Observe that x > 
+
=) x > (1 x) =) x > 1
2
((1 x)+x): One can see that the
equivalent occurs if x < 
+
: Therefore, there is generically (maxf; g > minf; g  1
2
)
no pure strategies equilibrium in which candidates oer identical platforms x = y 6= 
+
.
If x = 
+
one can show using the same formal arguments as before that any deviation
to the left or to the right of 
+
benets none of both parties. That is, f 
+
; 
+
g is, gener-
ically, the unique equilibrium of the game in pure strategies 2
4.1.2 Case 2. (Mixed Incentives)
We speak of mixed incentives when centrifugal forces dominate on one side and centripetal
forces on the other. In this case, the following Proposition establishes a general non-existence
result.
Proposition 3 If maxf; g > 1
2
> minf; g then there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that  > 1
2
> : Consider x < y: Then:
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@1
@x
(x; y) =   1
2
> 0 and @2
@y
(x; y) = 1
2
   < 0.
That is, there is no pure strategies equilibrium in which candidates oer distinct plat-
forms.
Now consider x = y = x 2 (0; 1): In this case we have:
1(x; x) = 2(x; x) =
1
2
((1  x) + x):
For fx; xg to be an equilibrium we must have that 1(x; x)  1(x  "; x) for "! 0 and
1(x; x)  1(1; x): These last inequalities are equivalent to 12((1  x) + x)  x =) x 

+
and to 1
2
((1   x) + x)  1 x
2
=) x  1 
1+  . We observe that they may both hold
only if 
+
 1 
1+  =)   12 which is not true. Finally consider that x = y = x 2 f0; 1g:
in this case it is trivial to see that a) if x = 0 then 1(0; 0) < 1("; 0) for "! 0 and that b) if
x = 0 then 1(1; 1) < 1(1  "; 1) for "! 0: That is, there is no pure strategies equilibrium
when maxf; g > 1
2
> minf; g 2
4.1.3 Case 3. ( Centrifugal Incentives)
We speak of centrifugal incentives when the voters who abstain or vote for a minority
party constitute a majority on both sides and a strict majority at least on one of the two
sides.
Proposition 4 (i) If maxf; g < 1
2
then the pure strategy proles f0; 1g and f1; 0g are
the unique pure strategy equilibria of the game.
(ii) If maxf; g = 1
2
and minf; g < 1
2
; all pure strategy proles (0; z) with z  1
2
;
z = x; y; are pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game if  < ; as well as all pure strategy
proles (z; 0) with z  1
2
; z = x; y; if  > :
Proof. (i) Consider x < y: Then:
@1
@x
(x; y) =   1
2
< 0 and @2
@y
(x; y) = 1
2
   > 0.
That is, if there are, pure strategy equilibria in which candidates oer distinct platforms
then they should be such that x = 0 and y = 1 or x = 1 and y = 0. Notice that 1(0; 1) =
1(1; 0) =
1
2
:
Now consider x = y = x: In this case we have:
1(x; x) = 2(x; x) =
1
2
((1  x) + x):
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Since maxf; g < 1
2
it is obvious that 1(x; x) <
1
4
for any x 2 [0; 1]: Therefore, f0; 1g
and f1; 0g are, indeed pure strategy equilibria of the game. Moreover we observe that
maxf1(1; x); 1(1; x)g > 14 when maxf; g < 12 : That is, f0; 1g and f1; 0g are the unique
pure strategy equilibria of the game
(ii) Consider  <  = 1
2
: Then 1(0; y) =
y
2
; 1(x; y) = x +
y x
2
for x 2 (0; y);
1(y; y) =
1
2
(y + 1
2
y) and 1(x; y) =
1 y
2
for x 2 (y; 1] and symmetrically for 2: The
same argument as above shows that there is no pure strategy equilibrium where the two
candidates oer the same platform. The remaining is straightforward. 2
4.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria6
4.2.1 Case 1. ( Centripetal Incentives)
For this case, the unique pure strategy equilibrium that we identied is a quite robust
prediction. Both due to the fact the equilibrium is unique and in pure strategies and because
it is symmetric; coordination issues should not interfere with the result. Note that while
competitive, it is not strictly competitive7 (Aumann 1961; Friedman 1983). Indeed, we note
that 1(0; 1) = 2(0; 1) =
1
2
while 1(

+
; 
+
) = 2(

+
; 
+
) = 
+
< 1
2
as  +  >
2 + 2  2 unless  =  = 1. This means that we have a prisoner's dilemma like
situation: a Nash equilibrium which is Pareto dominated. While not strictly competitive,
the game exhibits some competitive features and we conjecture that there is no equilibrium
in mixed strategies.
4.2.2 Case 2. (Mixed Incentives)
As we saw above, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this case. Assume without loss
of generality that  > 1
2
> : then the following is true.
Proposition 5 There exists a unique symmetric absolutely continuous mixed equilibrium
fG;Gg dened as follows:
6In this subsection, we use a concept of mixed strategy equilibria which is more restrictive than in
Proposition 1 since it excludes pure strategy equilibria.
7A game is strictly competitive if all possible outcomes are Pareto-optimal.
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G(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2
1 2
1   +

1  1
+ (2 1)
2(+ 1) (x(+ )  ) 1+
1
+ if x 2
"
+(

1  1
+ (2 1)
1 2 )
+
+ 1
+
; 1
#
0 if x 2
"
0;
+(

1  1
+ (2 1)
1 2 )
+
+ 1
+
# when + 6= 1
and
G(x) =
8<: 1 +
1 2
2
ln x 
1  if x 2
h
e
2 (1 2) ln(1 )
2 1 + ); 1
i
0 if x 2
h
0; e
2 (1 2) ln(1 )
2 1 + )
i when +  = 1
Proof. If there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium (G;G) in mixed strategies such that
G is absolutely continuous with positive density g on the interval [g; g]  [0; 1] (this implies
G(g) = 0 and G(g) = 1), it must be the case that:
1(x;G) =
xR
g
[(x  x+y
2
) + (1  x)]dG(y) +
gR
x
[(x+y
2
  x) + x]dG(y) =  for x 2 [g; g]
and that 1(x;G)   for x =2 [g; g]: If there is such a G then @1@x (x;G) = 0 for x 2 [g; g]:
That is:
(   x  x)g(x) + (1    )G(x) +   1
2
= 0 for x 2 [g; g]:
The general solution of this rst order dierential equation is:
G(x) =
1
2
1  2
1     + C (x(+ )  )
1
+
 1 when +  6= 1 and
G(x) = C +
2  1
2
ln (x  ) when +  = 1:
where C is a constant of integration. We notice that g must be equal to 1: This is because
when x < y we have that @2
@y
(x; y) = 1
2
  > 0: So if g < 1 then @2
@y
(G; y) =
gR
g
(1
2
 )dG(x) =
(1
2
  ) > 0 for any y > g. That is g is not a best response to G and, thus, a symmetric
equilibrium fG;Gg with g < 1 is not possible. From this observation we get that G(1) = 1:
Using this information to compute C in both expressions, we get:
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G(x) =
1
2
1  2
1     +
1 
1
+ (2   1)
2(+    1) (x(+ )  )
 1+ 1
+ when +  6= 1 and
G(x) = 1 +
2  1
2
ln
x  
1   when +  = 1:
Next we set G(g) = 0 and we nd:
g =
 + (
1  1
+ (2 1)
1 2 )
+
+ 1
+ 
> 0 when +  6= 1 and
g = e
2 (1 2) ln(1 )
2 1 +  >  > 0 when +  = 1:
We know that when x > y we have that @2
@y
(x; y) =    1
2
> 0: So if g > 0 then
@2
@y
(G; y) =
1R
g
(   1
2
)dG(x) = (   1
2
) > 0 for any y < g. That is, if party 1 plays G then
party 2 strictly prefers g to any y < g and is indierent among any of the policies in [g; 1];
playing G is a best response of 2 to party 1 playing G: This concludes the argument 2
It is important to note that the density is decreasing and therefore that the CDF is
concave. Examples of such mixed strategies are provided on gures 7 and 8.
Insert Figure 7 here
Insert Figure 8 here
4.2.3 Case 3. ( Centrifugal Incentives)
As we saw above, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in this case. Therefore,
in absence of a coordination mechanism the two mirror pure strategy equilibria that we
identied are not very robust.
Proposition 6 If maxf; g  1
2
and 0 < minf; g < 1
2
; then there exists unique
symmetric absolutely continuous mixed equilibrium fG;Gg given by:
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G(x) =
8<: 12 1 21   +
(2 1)( ) 1+
1
+ 
2(+ 1) (x(+ )  )
1
+
 1 if x 2 [0; 
+
)
1
2
1 2
1   +
(2 1)1 
1
+
2(+ 1) (x(+ )  )
1
+
 1 if x 2 [ 
+
; 1]
Proof. The derivation of the general form of G(x) is performed as before. The big
dierence here is that, unlike the maxf; g > 1
2
> minf; g case, the support [g; g]
 [0; 1] of a symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium should be such that [g; g] = [0; 1]: This
is because, if g > 0 (one can oer an equivalent argument to exclude the g < 1 case) then
@2
@y
(G; y) =
gR
g
(   1
2
)dG(x) = (   1
2
) < 0 for any y < g. That is, playing g

is not a
best response of party 2 to party 1 playing such a mixed strategy. Therefore, if a symmetric
atomless mixed equilibrium exists it should satisfy [g; g] = [0; 1] G(0) = 0 and G(1) = 1:Since
in this case +  6= 1, the general form of G(x) is:
G(x) =
1
2
1  2
1     + C(x(+ )  )
1
+
 1:
We know that if G(0) = 0 then C = (2 1)( )
 1+ 1
+ 
2(+ 1) and if G(1) = 1 then C =
(2 1)1 
1
+
2(+ 1) : So if such an equilibrium exists then G(x) should be a piece wise function. If
we dene:
GA(x) =
1
2
1  2
1     +
(2  1)( ) 1+ 1+ 
2(+    1) (x(+ )  )
1
+
 1
and
GB(x) =
1
2
1  2
1     +
(2   1)1  1+
2(+    1) (x(+ )  )
1
+
 1
we observe that GA(x) = GB(x) if and only if x =

+
:Moreover we have that GA(0) = 0;
@GA
@x
> 0 for any x 2 [0; 
+
]; @GB
@x
> 0 for any x 2 [ 
+
; 1] and G(1) = 1: In other words G is
a continuous, strictly increasing cumulative distribution function with full support in [0; 1]:
So if party 1 uses this strategy then 2(G; y) =  for any y 2 [0; 1]; party 2 playing G is
a best response to party 1 playing G 2
We observe that the shape of the mixed equilibrium will depend upon the value of +.
If + is less than 1, the probability mass will be more on the extremes with a density rst
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decreasing and then increasing. Dierent shapes of the density may appear, as illustrated
on gures 9 and 10.
Insert Figure 9 here
Insert Figure 10 here
If +  = 1, then G is uniform as illustrated on gure 11.
Insert Figure 11 here
Finally, if  +  is larger than 1, then the probability mass is more concentrated in the
center with a density rst increasing and then decreasing, as illustrated on gure 12.
Insert Figure 12 here
Remark 2 There is a smooth transition between the pure symmetric Nash equilibria and the
mixed ones. For the sake of illustration take  = . When  2 0; 1
4

, the mass of 1
2
on both
sides of 1
2
is located around the two extremes and tends to 1
2
0+
1
2
1
8 when  tends to 0. That
is, for (; ) = (0; 0) a symmetric mixed equilibrium of the game is given by the diagonal
prole of mixed strategies (G;G) where G = 1
2
0 +
1
2
1. In contrast, when  2

1
4
; 1
2

, the
mass of 1
2
on both sides of 1
2
is located around 1
2
and tends to  1
2
when  tends to 1
2
.
5 Discussion and Complements
In this section, we discuss some issues to which we have alluded before without providing
details. We discuss in turn, non uniform distributions of the voters, the behavioral origins
of centrifugal incentives and the equilibrium analysis.
5.1 Non Uniform Distributions and Rational Origins of Centrifu-
gal Incentives
In our simple model of electoral competition, the strategic calculus of each party is based on
marginal rates of substitution. For instance, for the leader of the party located on the left,
the relevant question is: how many centrist voters do I gain and how many leftist voters do I
lose if my platform becomes innitesimally more rightist. Consider an arbitrary distribution
8z denotes the Dirac mass in z.
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of voters described by the density f which will be assumed dierentiable, symmetric with
respect to (i.e. f(x) = f(1   x) for all x 2 0; 1
2

) and strictly increasing on

0; 1
2

( and so
strictly decreasing on

1
2
; 1

). Consider a prole of platforms (x; y) such that: x  1
2
 y and
consider the symmetric case where  = : Without loss of generality assume that x+y
2
 1
2
.
For the left party, moving on the right leads to a gain of 1
2
f(x+y
2
) voters and to a lost of
(1 )f(x) voters. If   1
2
, then the gain is always larger than the cost and the equilibrium
is dened by x = y = 1
2
. If otherwise  < 1
2
, a marginal equilibrium is obtained when the
marginal rate of substitution
1
2
f(x+y
2
)
(1 ))f(x) is equal to 1 i.e.
1
2
f(
x+ y
2
) = (1  )f(x)
i.e.
f(x) =
1
2 (1  )f(
x+ y
2
)
Let us test when the symmetric prole (x; 1  x) with x < 1
2
is a (local) Nash equilibrium9.
From above, the rst order condition writes:
f(x) =
1
2 (1  )f(
1
2
)
If f(0) = 0, then the above equation has a unique solution x. We may also check that
the (local) second order condition is satised. Indeed the second derivative at x
1
4
f 0(
1
2
) + (  1)f 0(x) = (  1)f 0(x)
is negative as  < 1. For the sake of illustration consider the (symmetric) Beta distribution10:
f(x) =
 (2)
 ()2
(x (1  x)) 1 over [0; 1]
with  > 1. In such case, x is the solution of the equation:
x(1  x) = 1
4

1
2 (1  )
 1
 1
We obtain:
9Since we have assumed f strictly increasing, this argument does not apply to the uniform distribution.
In fact, for the uniform distribution the marginal rate of substitution at any prole (x; y) is equal to 12(1 ) .
It is equal to only by accident, precisely when  = 12 .
10  denotes the Gamma function. In particular  (n) = (n  1)! for any integer n.
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x =
1
2
 
r
1 

1
2(1 )
 1
 1
2
As expected, we observe that dierentiation x (; ) is reduced when the electorate is
more concentrated around the center ( large values of ) or when the centrifugal incentives
are less intense. This is illustrated on table 1 for  = 0 and on table 2 for  = 1
4
.
 2 10 100
x 0:14645 0:36387 0:45824
Table 1
 2 10 100
x 0:21132 0:39506 0:46803
Table 2
Of course, we could consider marginal rates of substitution constructed in a totally dif-
ferent manner. In this paper, we have not explicitly derived the behavior of voters to the
right of the rightest platform or the left of the more to the left platform from an explicit
rational choice model. In the case where the lost votes go to one of the two extreme parties
located respectively in 0 and in 1, their behavior can be rationalized in many alternative
ways. While the decision to abstain can be motivated by the utility dierential between
the two platforms, it can also well be the case (as supported by questionnaire evidence in
the recent French presidential elections) that extreme voters (on the left and on the right)
were displeased by the centrist attitudes of the two leading candidates and decide to abstain
or to vote for extremist parties. In the traditional model where all policy dimensions are
summarized by the one dimensional ideological axis, the fraction of the electorate between
0 and x should be divided dierently. A rational model would suggest the replacement of
F (x) by F (x)  F (x
2
) for the left party. The payo of the left party is now equal to:
1(x; y) = F (
x+ y
2
)  F (x
2
)
But we could also assume that no all voters between 0 and x
2
vote for the extreme party as
while attracted on this specic ideological dimension, they may be repulsed by some other
dimensions (there are xed positions as opposed to those which are coined as pliable by
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Grossman and Helpman (2001)). For some voters the attractiveness of the extreme party is
dominated by other considerations. Suppose that a voter located at t 2 [0; x] vote for 0 i
t <  (x  t) where  is a positive preference parameter. The larger is , the more willing is
voter t to vote for the extreme left party:  is inversely related to the repulsion created by
the other ideological dimensions of the extreme left party. In such a case the payo of the
left party is equal to:
F (
x+ y
2
)  F ( x
1 + 
)
When  tends to 0, we have the standard Downsian model while when  tends to +1,
we have the case where the left party loses all the voters to its left. In the case where F is
uniform, we obtain:
1(x; y) =
y
2
+ x

1
2
  
1 + 

i.e. the model of this paper with  = 1
1+
.
An alternative rationale for the game which is played by the two main parties results
from the following two-stage game. In the rst stage two purely vote-share maximizing
parties (we will call them "unconstrained") choose their platforms x and y from the discrete
policy space f0; 1
n
; 2
n
; :::; 1g. In the second stage two parties with heterogeneous ideological
constraints (we will call them "constrained") observe the choices of the unconstrained parties
and choose their policy platforms from the same policy space in the following manner. One
of these two parties is constrained to oer a policy at most as right as minfx; yg and the
other is constrained to oer a policy at most as left as maxfx; yg. These constraints capture
the restraints that symbolic politics impose on real political outcomes. A party, for example,
with the term "communist" in its name is very hard to choose a policy platform to the right
of a party which proclaims to be socialist or centrist even if it is run by the most oce-
motivated of politicians. Each of these two parties either cares to secure as much votes as
possible (without violating the aforementioned ideological constraints) or it aims to preserve
its ideological purity by sticking to its traditional political platform. We assume that there is
imperfect information about this dimension of the game. That is, the "unconstrained" parties
which move rst expect that the constrained parties will behave as vote-share maximizers
with probability p and that they will stick to their traditional ideological platforms with
probability (1   p): We nally consider that the ideal policies of a continuum of voters is
distributed uniformly in the policy space and that a voter votes for the party which oered
the policy platform nearer to her ideal policy. In the extreme case in which a voter equally
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values the policy platform of a constrained party and the policy platform of an unconstrained
party we assume that the voter votes for the unconstrained one. That is, we assume that the
unconstrained parties enjoy a minimal valence advantage compared to the constrained ones
as in Aragones and Palfrey (2002). If the constrained parties are vote-share maximizers (with
probability p) they choose maxf0;minfx; yg   1
n
g and minf1;maxfx; yg + 1
n
g respectively
and if they aim to preserve their ideological purity (with probability 1  p) we assume that
they choose their traditional platforms 0 and 1 respectively. Notice that for n ! 1 this
model converges to the model of this paper with  =  = 1
2
(1   p)  1
2
; the case of strong
centrifugal incentives.
5.2 Missing Equilibria
We have shown that for all (; ) 2 [0; 1]2, our game admits an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies. We have not totally characterized the set of Nash equilibria. The purpose of this section
is to elaborate on that and in particular to identify (if any) new symmetric or asymmetric
Nash equilibria.
To illustrate the issue, consider the case where  =  = 0. In such case:
1(x; y) =

y x
2
if x  y
x y
2
if x  y
Note that the game is continuous. We already know that (0; 1) and (1; 0) and (G;G)
(where G = 1
2
0 +
1
2
1) are Nash equilibria. Let x 2 [0; 1]. Consider now the o diagonal
prole
 
1
2
; G

. What is the best response of party 2 to 1
2
? Let y 2 [0; 1]. Since 2(12 ; y) =
1
2
y   1
2
, 0 and 1 are the best responses. Therefore  1
2
; G

is also a Nash equilibrium.
Finally11, consider the o diagonal prole (U;G) where U denotes the uniform probability
on [0; 1]. What is the best response of party 2 to U ? Let y 2 [0; 1]. Since 2(U; y) =R y
0
y x
2
dx +
R 1
y
x y
2
dx = y
2
2
  y
2
+ 1
4
is convex and symmetric around 1
2
;0 and 1 are the best
responses. Therefore (U;G) is also a Nash equilibrium. Can we focus on specic Nash
equilibria in this plethora of Nash equilibria ? We note that in the case of (0; 1) and (1; 0),
1 = 2 =
1
2
, while for all others 1 = 2 =
1
4
. We have here a real coordination problem12.
The two parties should occupy the extremes but may fail to do so by lack of coordination.
In that respect the mixed strategies G and U are less risky.
This construction extends to the general case. Let (; ) 2 0; 1
2
2
and let G be the mixed
strategy p0+(1 p)1 where p 2 [0; 1]. Since 1(x;G) = p

x
2
+ (1  x)+(1 p)(x+ 1 x
2
)
11It is clear from the examples provided here that we can construct more Nash equilibria.
12If left and right have an intrinsic meaning, note however that the prole (0; 1) stands as the natural
equilibrium.
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for all x 2 ]0; 1[, we obtain that it does not depend upon x i:
p =
1
2
 1  2
1     
In such case, since 1(0; G) = p

2
+ (1   p)1
2
and 1(1; G) = p
1
2
+ (1   p)
2
are strictly
smaller than 1(x;G) for all x 2 ]0; 1[, we obtain that any x 2 ]0; 1[ is a best response to
G. In particular, 1
2
is a best response to G. Since both 0 and 1 are best responses to 1
2
,
we have demonstrated that
 
1
2
; G

and
 
G; 1
2

are Nash equilibria. Consider also as before
the o diagonal prole (U;G) where U denotes the uniform probability on [0; 1]. What is
the best response of party 2 to U ? Let y 2 [0; 1]. Since 2(U; y) =
R y
0
y x
2
dx +
R 1
y
x y
2
dx = 
1
2
     y2+  +    1
2

y+ 1
4
is convex and symmetric around 1
2
if  =  and  < 1
4
, 0
and 1 are the best responses. Therefore, if  =  and  < 1
4
, (U;G) is also a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, consider the strategy prole (H;G) where H is the absolutely continuous mixed
strategy identied in section 4: We argued that any x 2 ]0; 1[ is a best response to G and,
thus, H is a best response to G: Moreover we know that any y 2 [0; 1] is a best response to
H: That is, (H;G) is also an equilibrium for (; ) 2 0; 1
2
2
:
We have just shown that for all (; ) 2 0; 1
2
2
, the game admits at least seven Nash
equilibria which are, counting for interchangeability: (0; 1),
 
1
2
; G

, (H;G) and (H;H). We
have also shown that for some specic congurations of the parameters  and , there are
some other Nash equilibria. In the case where  =  = 0, the symmetric atomic equilibrium
(G;G) replaces the the symmetric atomless equilibrium (H;H) derived when

0; 1
2
2
. We
conjecture that for all (; ) 2 0; 1
2
2
, the game admits a unique symmetric equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
6 Concluding Remarks
Contemporary empirical evidence questions the standard Downsian prediction of minimal
dierentiation13; parties are observed to oer distinct and, in some cases, very dierentiated
policy platforms. This paper introduced centrifugal incentives in the standard Downsian
model and analyzed the equilibrium behavior of electoral shares maximizing parties in this
context. Our analysis pointed to the fact that the observed dierentiation need not be
solely attributed to asymmetric characteristics of competing parties. It could very well be
attributed to elements of the electoral framework which reduce the appeal of centrist parties
to extremist voters.
13See Warwick (2004) for a discussion of recent theories and empirical ndings regarding the "riddle" of
party dierentiation.
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The equilibria that we characterized have certain very intuitive and some counterintuitive
dimensions. Some of the intuitive ndings are the following. The symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium that we characterized for the strong centripetal incentives case implies that the
parties' point of convergence will be in the side of the electoral spectrum in which attraction
of extremist voters is easier. Moreover, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that we
characterized for the case of strong centrifugal incentives indicates that the extremism of
parties' platforms increases when centrifugal incentives increase. Something which is less
intuitive though occurs in the case of mixed incentives. When voters to the right of both
parties' platforms nd it very hard to vote one of these two parties while voters to the left
nd it easier we have shown that in equilibrium a) (as far as extreme policies are concerned)
each of the competing parties will never choose an extreme left platform but will locate at the
extreme right with positive probability and b) (as far as moderate platforms are concerned)
it is more probable that each of the two parties chooses a moderate leftist platform than a
moderate rightist platform.
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